Good and Evil, Good and Bad

Are you good or good? Bad or evil? Nietzsche may just have the answer. For this piece I will focus on the first essay in his On the Genealogy of Morality (GM) entitled ”Good and Evil’, ‘Good and Bad”. The crux of this is the debate surrounding the power play between two types of morality, that of the master or warrior noble, and that of the slave or ‘herd’. It is important too to understand what he means when discussing genealogy and I will begin there.

He refers to the ‘English psychologists’; such as Hobbes, Hume and his one time friend the German Paul Rée, who Nietzsche groups with them, and criticises for their utilitarian linear understanding of the term. Genealogy for Nietzsche was not about legitimising people, institutions or traditions; it is not something that could be used to lend credibility to our present structures and ideals. There is no origin story and certainly not one relating to a small group of people hanging out and moralising in Palestine two thousand years ago. Genealogy is about a series of varying events from different places with different process’ converging, influencing and evolving again with others later. Even if there were an origin it likely wouldn’t be one we would approve of with our sense of compassionate Judeo-Christian morals, more one involving violence, coercion and subjugation. Ironically three things littered throughout the history of Christianity. A linear understanding of morality in the sense of it’s genealogy merely highlights the Christian influence upon the history of Europe in the last two thousand years. Nietzsche’s aim is to delegitimise the Judeo-Christian manipulation of this term and the credibility it grants them.

We exist now in a time of the slave morality, our moral code has been created by the weak, by the herd, and it has been created out of a resentful hateful impotence towards that of the warriors. What is meant by that is that in the past, say pre-history, so pre-Christian history, those with power were the warriors. They held on to their power through their strength and subsequently dictated what should be deemed morally ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The warrior or noble of this time valued strength, courage and glory, and classed these as ‘good’ values to achieve. For them anything other was deemed ‘bad’ in contrast to merely not being them and their ‘good’; the common man, the unhealthy, the weak.

The priests were also part of the nobility but without the political power of the warrior noble. They had the expectations of the nobility and subsequently believed a certain type of life had value above all others. They desired the wealth and especially the political power of this life but were weak comparable to the warriors, it was impossible to achieve their desires through the same means. Despite this impotence they maintained a ‘will to power’, they maintained a commitment to their desired life. This refusal to accept their impotence, while also recognising it’s existence led to deep envy and hatred within the priestly caste and from this they developed ressentiment. Their ressentiment was a “repressed vengefulness” (GM 1 : 7), an inability to exorcise and a suppression of their envy and hatred. They resented their impotence and the shame that came with it. According to Nietzsche this ressentiment became creative and from that gave birth to the slave morality. They constructed a positive value in what the warriors deemed ‘bad’. While the priests may have proclaimed love and compassion, their morals were created out of hatred, envy and resentment.

“Priests make the most evil enemies…Because they are the most powerless. Out of this powerlessness their hate swells” (GM 1 : 7).

The priests changed our understanding of morality, they changed what it was to be ‘good’ and more importantly what it was to be now ‘evil’. The very values held by the warriors, the affirmation of their own self-worth, importantly what maintained their position in society yet repressed or constricted others, became ‘evil’. The priests ‘good’ was the antithesis of the warriors ‘good’. The worshipping of meekness and the weak became a way of demonising the values of the warriors and as a way of circumventing and empowering themselves. The priest doesn’t need strength to achieve power, instead the priest merely convinces others that power itself is unworthy. The ‘evil’ warrior wants power while the priest merely wants neighbourly love, they created value in political equality. The issue for the priest though is that their ressentiment has not disappeared, they may condemn the nobles but they both still desire the same “victory, spoil and seduction” (GM 1 : 8). The difference being that the warrior nobles acted out of this positive affirmation for themselves, while the priests acted reactively out of impotent hatred and rejection of others.

The society based upon this slave morality may in a sense empower us, the herd, but it doesn’t exists in our best interests. It valorises the qualities which would be the inverse of what made the warrior’s powerful and ‘good’, we now exist in a world which commends this new ‘good’. We are commended for passivity, for meekness, for submissiveness, and in Nietzsche’s eyes, ultimately for mediocrity. We have created and exist in what has become a mediocre society full of mediocre people. The man of ressentiment created a world which feared the outsider, or anything different, it is a world born as a counter to the warrior’s ‘good’ and as such is a reactive world. The slave morality has created a culture in which everything exists within a mediocre rulebook of flawed moralities. They are flawed because they’re born out of this reactive hatred and because they valorise weakness and mediocrity. The reactive man of ressentiment lacks the introspective thought to realise their own self-worth and break free of this mediocrity. While this mediocrity may suit the herd it also suppresses anyone who may try to rise above and out of it, keeping all in this substandard mediocrity. An inevitable acceptance of this leads to a belief in the pointlessness of life and an embrace of nihilism.

Nietzsche held onto the classical realist position that moralities exist because they are in the interests of whichever group pushes them. Those in power will push self-interested morals and language that conserves the hierarchy and their position within it, in that sense compassion and equality can be viewed as fundamental tenets of the morals of those without power. The slave morality in this case can be viewed as just another way of creating the conditions best suited to the empowerment of the herd, or at least the priests through the herd.

Words such as ‘noble’, ‘aristocratic’ or ‘high-minded’ were conceptually linked with and synonymous with the warrior’s ‘good’, and ‘common’, ‘plebeian’ or ‘low’ with ‘bad’. In ancient Greek words for ‘real’ and ‘genuine’ evolved into meaning ‘noble’, and contrastingly ‘dark’ and ‘black’ would be used to describe dangers or untrustworthiness, as well as the dark skinned common man in the field who the blond white Aryan conqueror displaced. There was a steady manipulation of language to create an ingrained perspective of the value of the nobility and it’s position as the ‘good’ in society. In time the priests merely did the same. They associated ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ with ‘good’ and ‘evil’. The resultant connection of pureness with abstinence and restraint, the very values that also came with the impotence of powerlessness that the priests and slaves had in abundance.

Nietzsche believes there are types of people, in a sense that we’re born this way. He uses the bird of prey and lamb analogy to explain this. The bird of prey kills the lamb not because it is ‘evil’ but because it is a natural action. This is a sign of the strength of the bird and weakness of the lamb. The lamb though believes the bird of prey could not kill if it wanted and that it’s action is a choice, a belief that “the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb” as Nietzsche put it in Beyond Good and Evil. However he believed the bird of prey is not separate from it’s action, nor free to kill or not kill. The naturalness of it’s ability to kill the lamb is what makes the bird a bird of prey yet it is the lambs ressentiment which makes it believe it is a choice. The bird of prey becomes ‘evil’ for existing as it does and the lamb ‘good’ for the same reason. The slave morality lauds those who do not kill or hurt, and in turn praises those powerless to do so regardless. The priests turn their impotence into a positive and demonise the strengths of others.

This is an overview of the first essay in GM more than any type of critique. The intention is to give a general understanding as opposed to swaying the reader towards any particular interpretation.

What then is an emotion?

It turns out that emotions are not straight forward things. Perhaps instinctively we imagine them to be such things as anger, sadness, happiness, fear, joy et al. And it turns out likely that would be an acceptable initial if somewhat abstract understanding. Acceptable that is until you discover there is always a beyond the obvious.

For the eighteenth and early nineteenth century empiricists like Hume and Locke, the mind was a single field of thought and feeling, fully conscious and transparent to itself. This mind was made up of visual, auditory, and tactile impressions, and distinct ideas which were the product of these impressions. Or as Hume put it, “like players in a theatre who successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations”. These early ideas were later dismissed. The suggestion emotions were just these pure and simple things floating around waiting to come together before dissipating again was deemed flawed. It missed the point that emotions are not stand alone boxable feelings but unique and unrepeatable; the mind, the body, the moment are never twice the same. A unique amalgamation of everything if you wish.

From the late nineteenth century a philosophising psychologist called William James decided, and incidentally this is apparently still a respected idea in the psychology world, a statement that needs checking and confirming beyond one verbal source, that emotions were the result of bodily physiological sensations. What this means is that were we to see a bear in a forest, our body would react, for example our legs might go weak and our hearts beat wildly, and this would trigger the emotion of fear within us. While undoubtedly reactions on a physical level play a role in emotions, to claim those bodily feelings create the emotions doesn’t hold up when challenged with the fact our legs feel weak and our heart beat increases when we go for a run. In that circumstance the feeling of fear is generally not the emotion people feel. The fact physically you feel the same feelings when you experience love, fear and exercise explains why this stance in itself is not widely held in contemporary thought.

From here we move into more accepted ideas of emotions, the main two being judgements and perceptions. They state that we see the bear, make an evaluative judgement of the situation, feel the emotion and have a suitable physical response, or that after seeing the bear we have an emotional and physical response based upon how we perceive the situation to be. This being philosophy neither are fool proof. If we were to be standing behind guard rails looking over the edge of a cliff we may still feel fear despite the fact we have made the rational judgement that we are not in danger of falling over. We have a contradictory emotional response to how we have assessed the situation. This argument could be used for fear of household British spiders too. It is important to mention though that evaluative judgements are ever forming and not just made in the moment. Proponents in the perceptual model would suggest we feel fear as we look over the precipice because we can perceive the inherent danger, an argument which frankly holds up a lot better. Unlike the judgemental model which deals with the rational and irrational, the perceptual approach is arational. When they have to explain non-human animal and infant human emotions both struggle to justify their positions as neither beasts nor babies have the required language to make evaluative judgements nor, and this is very debatable, the cognitive abilities to have an instinctive perceptual reaction. This point definitely needs further investigation though.

Two thoughts that came up after todays seminar were whether we can have an unconscious emotion, for example feelings of pain in the neck or ache in the head are symptoms of the emotion of stress, yet we may be completely unaware we’re stressed or anxious about anything. Are we unconscious in that moment of the emotion or just unaware of it from a cognitive perspective. Is this emotion a physical feeling only. If we’re unaware of this emotion then it stands to say we’re not consciously aware of it and so unconscious of it, yet unconscious seems like too strong a word.

The second thought was whether perception is just an evaluation or judgement made at an earlier time. Do we perceive danger in the bear because long ago we made the judgement that bears are dangerous. We may make the judgement in the moment that the bear on the other side of the valley could do us harm but likely won’t and so we’re in little to no danger, yet we still feel the emotion of fear. We arguably perceive the possibility of danger, the danger we judged bears can inflict when we learnt bears as dangerous. My dog would likely also feel this danger but it’s doubtable a baby would, and arguably neither would a puppy.

This is as far as week one has really got. There was also mention of something called the Common Sense Theory which is that you see the bear, something cognitive happens, you feel the suitable emotion and have a bodily physiological reaction. Unfortunately in philosophy common sense seems to infer not suitably complicated and therefore deeply flawed so this theory only ever seems to be granted a couple of sentences at most. There has been a bit regarding recalcitrant emotions, which are emotions that conflict with judgements and likely perceptions but these will be the focus of the material in weeks two and three. Their existence was touched upon but just to bring an awareness to something that appears to sow difficulties in all the theories. This will become clear. As will hopefully a further and clearer understanding of what is very much a base and slightly confused understanding of the few concepts so far. Seemingly the philosophy of emotions is yet to find a generally held coherent argument. Arguably there’s something in all the perspectives and undoubtedly emotions consist of a combination of sensations, experiences, perceptions and judgements. Perhaps the truth simply lies in some as yet undiscovered or unmeasurable perspective and understanding. As yet of course.